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DOES THE PROBLEM OF MATERIAL 
CONSTITUTION ILLUMINATE THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY? 
William Lane Craig 
Michael Rea and Jeffery Brower have offered a provocative new model of 
the Trinity on the analogy of the Aristotelian solution to the problem of 
material constitution. Just as a fist and a hand can be distinct entities com-
posed of a common matter and yet numerically the same object, so the per-
sons of the Trinity can be distinct entities (persons) composed of a common 
"matter" (the divine essence) and yet numerically the same object (God). I 
express doubts about the degree to which this analogy sheds light on the 
doctrine of the Trinity due to the disanalogy that neither God nor the 
Trinitarian persons are to be thought of as composed of any sort of stuff and 
to the model's lack of explanatory power as to how a common matter can 
be simultaneously imbued with seemingly incompatible forms to constitute 
one object. 
In a provocative and carefully argued paper/ Michael Rea and Jeffrey 
Brower (hereafter R-B) have offered a creative, new way of understanding 
the Trinity based on the analogy of hylomorphic composition as under-
stood by Aristotle. They present their solution as "the most philosophical-
ly promising and theologically satisfying solution currently on offer."2 
R-B formulate the problem of the Trinity in terms of the seeming incom-
patibility of the three theses 
(T 1) Each person of the Trinity is distinct from each of the others. 
(T 2) Each person of the Trinity is God. 
(T 3) There is exactly one God. 
These three theses appear to imply that three distinct beings are each iden-
tical with one being, which is incoherent. 
Like the Social Trinitarian and the Relative Identity theorist, R-B avert 
incoherence by denying that (T2) is a statement of absolute identity. They 
reject, however, the usual Social Trinitarian and Relative Identity interpre-
tations of (T 2) in favor of an interpretation inspired by an Aristotelian 
account of material constitution. In their view (T2) should be understood 
in terms of numerical sameness without identity. 
The relation of numerical sameness without identity features promi-
nently in Aristotle's treatment of material constitution. Aristotle believed 
in a wide range of hylomorphic compounds, objects constituted by matter 
plus some organizing form. R-B explain that he even accepted the reality 
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of strange objects like "seated Socrates," which temporarily exists while 
Socrates is sitting down and is composed of a thing which is a substance in 
its own right (Socrates) plus some accidental form (seatedness). Although 
R-B acknowledge the kookiness of objects like seated Socrates, they insist 
that fans of common sense do 
believe in many things relevantly like seated Socrates. That is, we 
believe in things that can very plausibly be characterized as hylomor-
phic compounds whose matter is a familiar material object and whose 
form is an accidental property. We believe in fists and hands, bronze 
statues and lumps of bronze, gold coins and lumps of gold, cats and 
heaps of cat tissue, and so on.3 
In each case, the first member of the pair is composed of the second mem-
ber of the pair, which is taken to be an object in its own right, plus some 
accidental form. But such a belief gives rise to the problem of material con-
stitution. For a fist is not the same thing as a hand (a fist is essentially 
clenched whereas a hand is not), and yet when the hand takes the shape of 
a fist, there are not two material objects present but only one. R-B explain 
that for Aristotle the hand and the fist are distinct in being but one in num-
ber, that is to say, although the hand and the fist are distinct entities, they 
are only one material object. When the hand is clenched, the hand and the 
fist are numerically the same without being identical. R-B acknowledge 
that it is hard to swallow the idea that numerical sameness need not 
involve identity, but they dismiss such mental reservations, observing that 
any solution to the problem of material constitution is going to be counter-
intuitive. 
Assuming the acceptability of the Aristotelian solution to the problem of 
material constitution, R-B explain its relevance to the doctrine of the 
Trinity: 
... the Persons of the Trinity can also be conceived of in terms 
of hylomorphic compounds. Thus, we can think of the divine 
essence as playing the role of matter, and we can regard the proper-
ties being a Father, being a Son, and being a Spirit as distinct forms 
instantiated by the divine essence, each giving rise to a distinct 
Person. As with matter, we regard the divine essence not as an indi-
vidual thing in its own right but rather as that which, together with 
the requisite 'form' constitutes a Person. Each person will then be a 
compound structure whose matter is the divine essence and whose 
form is one of the three distinctive Trinitarian properties. On this 
way of thinking, the Persons of the Trinity are directly analogous to 
particulars that stand in the familiar relation of material constitution.' 
R-B proceed to note three disanalogies between the case of the Trinity and 
cases of familiar material constitution: 
1. In the case of the Trinity, unlike the case of a material object, the 
role of matter is played by non-matter, and so the structures or com-
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pounds constituted from it (namely, divine persons) will be 'hylo-
morphic' only in an extended or analogical sense. 
2. In the case of material objects, the form in a particular hylomor-
phic compound will typically only be contingently instantiated by 
the matter. Not so, however, in the case of the Trinity. For Christian 
orthodoxy requires us to say that properties like being a Father and 
being a Son are essentially such as to be instantiated by the divine 
essence. 
3. The relation of accidental sameness on which our solution is mod-
eled is, in Aristotle anyway, paradigmatically a relation between a 
substance (e.g., a man) and a hylomorphic structure built out of the 
substance and an accidental property. The Persons, however, are not 
like this. Thus, it is at best misleading to say that the relation 
between them is one of accidental sameness. Better instead to go with 
the other label we have used .... : the persons stand in the relation 
of numerical sameness without identity.s 
While acknowledging these disanalogies, R-B think that they are of little 
import. They conclude, 
It seems not at all inappropriate to think of the divine Persons on 
analogy with hylomorphic compounds; and once they are thought of 
this way, the problem of the Trinity disappears. Return to the analo-
gy with material objects: According to the Aristotelian solution to the 
problem of material constitution, a statue and its constitutive lump 
are two distinct hylomorphic compounds; yet they are numerically 
one material object. Likewise, then, the Persons of the Trinity are 
three distinct Persons but numerically one God.6 
R-B's account does not wear its interpretation on its face. Some careful exe-
gesis is required if we are to understand the purported analogy. 
What, to begin with, do R-B mean by "the divine essence"? They surely 
do not mean, one thinks, that the divine essence is a sort of immaterial stuff 
which is formed into the Trinitarian persons, as the analogy with hylomor-
phism suggests. This is surely to press the matter I form analogy too far. 
On the orthodox view God is not composed out of any sort of stuff, and it 
is difficult in any case to make sense of immaterial stuff (as opposed to an 
immaterial substance or thing). So charity would seem to demand that we 
interpret the "divine essence" to designate something other than the stuff 
of which the Father, Son, and Spirit are composed.7 
But in fact R-B do mean to affirm that the divine essence is the stuff out 
of which the Trinitarian persons are "made."B In personal correspondence, 
Rea explains, "Actually, we are suggesting that the Persons are composed 
of the divine essence plus some form .... The idea is that the divine 
essence plays the role of 'commonly shared matter' among the Persons, 
and the Persons stand to one another in the relation of NSWI [Numerical 
Sameness without Identity]."" 
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But in this case, the first disanalogy they note-that the role of matter is 
played by non-matter-Iooms exceedingly large. Rea avers, 
All we mean to commit ourselves to is the idea that maybe the 
Persons are like a hylomorphic structure: there's something (we call 
it 'the divine essence' to connect with the portions of the tradition 
that say that the Persons are' of one essence' or 'of one substance'; but 
you could call it something else if you like) that plays the role of com-
monly shared matter, and, for each Person, something else that plays 
the role of form.lO 
This explanation fails to allay one's misgivings. When the tradition affirms 
that the persons of the Trinity are of one essence or substance, it did not 
mean to affirm that there is some common stuff or substratum shared by the 
persons, but rather that the persons share the same generic nature or are one 
being. The latter interpretation corresponds to Aristotle's primary sense of 
"substance" and the former to his secondary sense of "substance." The affir-
mation of the Council of Nicea that the Father and the Son are homoousios 
could be understood to mean that they share the same essence and are there-
fore equally divine. But the persons of the Trinity are not like three distinct 
men who all share the same generic essence of manhood; rather they are also 
one substance in the sense that they are one subsisting thing, one God, not 
three Gods. What the tradition did not mean was that God or the persons of 
the Trinity were composed of some sort of spiritual stuff. 
In fact, the adoptionist Paul of Samosata, according to the accounts 
given by Basil and Athanasius, tried to pin on the partisans of Nicea pre-
cisely the charge that their use of homoousios with respect to the Father and 
the Son implied that the Father and the Son have a common constitutive 
substance, which even Paul took to be absurd. Basil vehemently rejects 
any such implication: 
For they [Paul's sympathizers 1 maintained that the homoousion set 
forth the idea both of essence and of what is derived from it, so that 
the essence, when divided, confers the title of co-essential on the 
parts into which it is divided. This explanation has some reason in 
the case of bronze and coins made therefrom, but in the case of God 
the Father and God the Son there is no question of substance anterior 
or even underlying both; the mere thought and utterance of such a 
thing is the last extravagance of impiety.n 
In the case of the persons of the Trinity or God there is just nothing analo-
gous to the role played by matter in material things. Indeed, as already 
mentioned, the idea of an immaterial stuff, of which God or a divine per-
son consists, seems scarcely intelligible. At a minimum, R-B owe us a 
fuller explanation of how the divine persons can be taken to be analogous 
to hylomorphic compounds. 
Once we understand that R-B do mean to affirm that the divine essence 
is a sort of stuff of which the Trinitarian persons consist, then the analogy 
they draw with hylomorphic compounds becomes clear. The divine 
PROBLEM OF MATERIAL CONSTITUTION 81 
essence is like matter, and that is why it is not a thing. The divine essence 
is not like the hand or the man which are formed respectively into the fist 
or the seated man, for that would require the divine essence to be both a 
thing in its own right and numerically the same as but not identical with 
each divine person, which would not solve the problem of the Trinity and 
is not what R-B want to affirm. That is why in their third dis analogy R-B 
point out that their solution differs from their paradigm examples of mate-
rial constitution in that Trinity does not involve a relation between a sub-
stance and a hylomorphic compound (whether the relation is accidental or 
essential is incidental to the disanalogy). Rather the divine essence is like 
unformed matter and when imbued with the relevant personal form con-
stitutes a Trinitarian person. So each person is like a hylomorphic com-
pound, just as the hand and the fist are each compounds formed out of a 
common matter. So far numerical sameness without identity does not 
enter the picture. 
That peculiar relation comes into play when R-B assert that "the Persons 
of the Trinity are directly analogous to particulars that stand in the familiar 
relation of material constitution." The particulars they refer to here are 
things like the hand and the fist, and the familiar relation referred to is pre-
sumably the relation of numerical sameness without identity, in which the 
hand and fist stand to each other. Composed of a common matter, the hand 
and the fist are two different things which are nonetheless one object. 
Analogously, the persons of the Trinity, composed of a common divine stuff, 
are three different things (persons) which are nonetheless one object (God). 
So what R-B want to say is that the relation between the Father and the 
Son, for example, is like the relation between the hand and the fist: numer-
ical sameness without identity. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are dis-
tinct entities but count as one object, which is God. Just as the hand and 
the fist are composed of the same matter plus an accidental form, so the 
persons of the Trinity are composed of the same divine essence plus certain 
person-individuating properties. So in the Trinity we have a sort of imma-
terial stuff constituting three persons who are numerically the same object 
while being non-identical. 
Further interpretive difficulties arise. In their second disanalogy to typi-
cal cases of material constitution, R-B claim that Christian orthodoxy 
requires them to say that properties like being a Father are essentially such 
as to be instantiated by the divine essence. Is this what R-B really want to 
say? The claim appears to assume that being a Father is a transcendent or 
Platonic universal which essentially exemplifies the second order property 
of being instantiated by the divine essence. This does not, however, preclude 
this property's being exemplified by something else as well. If we adjust 
the second-order property to be being instantiated ollly by the divine essence, 
then the case of the Trinity is not disanalogous to material objects, because 
the property, e.g., being Michelangelo's 'David' plausibly exemplifies essen-
tially the second-order property being instantiated only by such-and-such mar-
ble, i.e., the statue could not have been made of wood or ice. What R-B 
want to say, I think, is that the divine essence has the essential property of 
being a Father. But if the divine essence is the Father, then why would the 
divine essence not be identical with the Father? The indefinite description 
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"a Father" cannot be taken to fail to designate uniquely God the Father, if 
we are to have an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. If some matter has 
essentially the property of being a particular statue, then it is identical to 
that statue. It might be thought that one could avoid this problem by hold-
ing that the divine essence exemplifies other essential properties peculiar 
to itself and so is not identical with the Father. But the difficulty with this 
reply is that that does not seem to be possible on the R-B view. R-B, on the 
other hand, cannot allow the divine essence to be identical with the Father, 
for it is not an object, and if it were then the transitivity of identity would 
imply the Father's identity with the Son. What R-B want to say is that the 
divine essence has the essential property, not of being a Father, but rather of 
constituting a Father. The divine essence essentially constitutes but is not 
identical with its object. It would be as though some gold essentially exem-
plified the property constituting the last-minted U.S. twenty-dollar coin or 
some marble essentially exemplified the property constituting 
Michelangelo's 'David'. 
The question, then, is whether construing the persons of the Trinity on 
the analogy of hylomorphic compounds serves to illuminate the doctrine 
of the Trinity or to provide us with a coherent model of the three in one. 
Here I must confess that I fail to see that R-B's proposal sheds much light 
on that doctrine. 
R-B believe that once we think of the divine persons on the analogy of 
hylomorphic compounds, the problem of the Trinity disappears. But this 
is far too quick. For the unity and diversity in material constitution do not 
seem at all analogous to the unity and diversity in the Trinity. In the case 
of material constitution, we are supposed to come to see that a hand and a 
fist, for example, or a lump of marble and a statue, are two non-identical 
things which count as one material object. The analogy to the this is that 
the Father, for example, though non-identical with the Son, is numerically 
the same spiritual object as the Son. This analogy will hold for each of the 
divine persons. Of each one it can be said that it is not identical with but 
numerically the same spiritual object as the other divine persons. 
But this does nothing to resolve the Trinitarian aporia. It does not tell us 
how seemingly mutually exclusive hylomorphic compounds can be 
numerically the same object. We are told that one object can be both a 
hand and a fist. All right. But how can one object be simultaneously a 
clenched fist and an open hand? How can a quantity of gold be at once a 
U.S. twenty-dollar coin and a Spanish doubloon? How can Socrates be at 
once seated Socrates, standing Socrates, and reclining Socrates? How can 
the Winged Victory and the David and the Venus de Milo be numerically 
the same object? These are the correct analogies to the Trinity, where the 
same spiritual object is said to be at once the Father and the Son and the 
Holy Spirit. 
Work on the use of personal indexicals in recent decades has served to 
highlight strikingly the exclusivity and privacy of the first-person perspec-
tive.12 Others may know that William Craig is the second child of Mallory 
and Doris Craig, but I alone can know that I am the second child of 
Mallory and Doris Craig; no one else can access my first person perspective 
nor can this same knowledge be reduced to a third-person perspective. 
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Thus, among the three persons of the Trinity there are three irreducible 
and exclusive first-person perspectives which not even the classic doctrine 
of pcrichoreisis can dissolve. The Father knows, for example, that the Son 
dies on the cross, but He does not and cannot know that He Himself dies 
on the cross-indeed, the view that He so knows even has the status of 
heresy: patripassianism. Thus how the three persons of the Trinity can be 
numerically the same spiritual object remains as mysterious and problem-
atic as how three statues can each be one and the same material object. 
R-B admit that the explication 
(R1) x is a God iff x is a hylomorphic compound whose matter is 
some divine essence; x is the same God as y iff x and yare each hylo-
morphic compounds whose matter is some divine essence and x's 
matter is the same matter as y's; and there is exactly one God iff there 
is an x such that x is a God and every God is the same God as x 
when taken all by itself and in isolation is apt to appear "just as mysterious 
as the conjunction of T1-T3."13 But they claim that "much of the mystery 
goes away" once we appreciate the parallelism of (R1) to a principle con-
cerning material constitution, namely, 
(M2) x is a material object iff x is a hylomorphic compound; exactly one 
material object fills a region R iff at least one hylomorphic compound 
fills R; and x is (numerically) the same material object as y iff x and y 
are hylomorphic compounds sharing the same matter in common. 
It seems evident that the mystery remains unrelieved by this parallel. (M2) 
tells us that the David and a marble lump are each a material object; that 
they are numerically the same object just in case they share the same mat-
ter; and that if both of them fill R there is only one object that fills R But it 
remains wholly obscure how the David and the Venus de Milo could share 
the same matter and so be numerically the same material object or how 
they could both fill R But this is the sort of thing that (M2) must render 
intelligible if it is to elucidate (R1), which means to explicate the Father's 
being the same spiritual object or God as the Son. The mystery remains. 
R-B proceed to make further problematic claims. They state that their 
view allows us to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each identi-
cal with God, and yet they are mutually distinct.14 This is due to the ambi-
guity of the sortal term "God." Again they appeal to the analogy of materi-
al constitutionY Imagine two hylomorphic compounds, like a statue and a 
marble lump, filling the region R What is the material object that fills R? 
R-B reply that it is both a statue and a lump. The expression "the object 
that fills R" is ambiguous and can refer to either the statue or the lump. 
Thus, the David is identical to the material object in R, and so is its consti-
tutive lump of marble, but the David is distinct from the marble lump due 
to the ambiguity of "the material object in R" Analogously, the sortal 
"God" is ambiguous. When one says the Father is identical with the spiri-
tual object which is God, one picks out a distinct entity from what is picked 
out when one says the Son is identical with the spiritual object which is 
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God, even though numerically these are the same object. 
R-B's claim that each of the divine persons is identical with God is very 
problematic. Prima facie it contradicts their earlier assertion that on their 
view (T 2) is not to be interpreted as the affirmation that each of the persons 
"is absolutely identical with God," but rather as an affirmation of numeri-
cal sameness without identity.ln So which is it? A charitable interpretation 
would be that these two interpretations are affirmed to be equally viable, 
alternate readings of (T 2) on the R-B view. On the identity interpretation, 
the relation of numerical sameness without identity obtains only between 
the persons of the Trinity, but not between each person and the spiritual 
object called God. The relation between each person and that object is 
absolute identity, but due to the ambiguity of the term "God" arising from 
relations of numerical sameness without identity between the persons of 
the Trinity, different entities are picked out by various Trinitarian identity 
statements like "The Father is God," "The Son is God," and so on, and so 
transitivity of identity does not come into play. By contrast on the numeri-
cal sameness without identity interpretation, relations of numerical same-
ness without identity are said to obtain not only between the persons of the 
Trinity, but also between each person and the spiritual object called God. 
Each person is said to be numerically the same as but not identical to the 
object God, as well as each other. Curiously, R-B have said almost nothing 
to motivate this latter interpretation, though they give it pride of place, 
since they have concentrated on analyzing the inter-personal relations in 
the Trinity in terms of numerical sameness without identity, not the rela-
tions between the persons and the spiritual object God. 
Difficulties persist. In the first place, even if "the object that fills R" is 
ambiguous when referring to the David or its constitutive lump of marble, 
it is not ambiguous when it comes to picking out either the David or the 
Winged Victory. The David and the lump can both fill R and so be 
ambiguously referred to by "the object that fills R" But the David and the 
Winged Victory cannot, to all appearances, both fill R, so there is no ambi-
guity in their regard. Similarly, is it not implausible to think that "God" is 
ambiguous when it comes to the Father and the Son? Given the exclusivity 
and privacy of the first-person perspective, persons are as impenetrable as 
statues. So how could they both fill R? Parity would suggest that just as in 
the case of the David and the Winged Victory we have two material 
objects, so in the case of the Father and the Son we have two spiritual 
objects, two Gods, 
Second, R-B explain that due to the ambiguity of the phrase "the object 
that fills R," there is no correct answer to the question of what are the essen-
tial properties of the object in R17 One has to disambiguate before answer-
ing the question concerning what the essential properties of the object are. 
But this seems to imply that the question as to the essential properties of the 
spiritual object called "God" is equally unanswerable. That question can be 
answered only relative to some disambiguating description. But this seems 
to be the very feature of Relative Identity which R-B pronounced "cata-
strophic" and "disastrous" when applied to the Trinity.ls The numerically 
same object can be either identical to the Father or identical to the Son 
dependent upon how we choose to describe it. But R-B rejected Relativity 
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Identity because "we do not want to say that the very existence of the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is a theory-dependent matter. Nor do we want 
to say that the distinction of the Persons is somehow relative to our ways of 
thinking or theorizing. That appears to be a form of modalism."19 It is hard 
to see how R-B can avoid a similar charge. They might say that the Father 
and Son are really non-identical on their view, but that our linguistic terms 
"Father" and "Son" are ambiguous in their reference. But then it is inaccu-
rate to say that statements like "The Father is identical with God" are true, 
for the terms do not unambiguously refer. If the statements are true and the 
ambiguity is ontological, then one does seem guilty of making identity rela-
tive to one's thinking or theorizing. 
In sum, the disanalogies between the Aristotelian account of material 
constitution and the doctrine of the Trinity seem so great that appeal to 
that account does little to illuminate the Christian doctrine. If anything, the 
analogy of material constitution ought to incline us to think that the divine 
essence cannot constitute the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit at once. All this 
has been said on the assumption that the strange doctrine of numerical 
sameness without identity is metaphysically acceptable, which assumption 
is, it scarcely needs to be said, moot,2° I do not intend these criticisms of the 
R-B proposal as a refutation of the model so much as an invitation to fur-
ther reflection on it. Rea and Brower have offered us a provocative, new 
way of understanding the Trinity, but they still have a lot of explaining to 
do before their interpretation becomes illuminating or plausible. I hope 
that these brief criticisms will be a spur to further exploration of their 
model,21 In the meantime I have elsewhere offered a quite different social 
model of the Trinity which I venture to think escapes all their criticisms of 
Social Trinitarianism. 22 
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